THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE THE U 2 AND OXCART PROGRAMS 1954 1974

fri{) _i \ ~===~===~~: : : : :~ /.,:. ,.... . THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND -:.,:-. OVERHEAD (7 ; R ECONNA ISSANCE ! ..,: The U-2 and OX C.\RT Programs, 1954 - 1974 • ~ •.... .. ·::/ ' ' .,. Gregory 'vV. Pedlow and Donald E. vVelzenbach !:·-~~--.~..; ' ::::..:· t> ·r:~.;.,- -:_;~::-:...~ f ; ":· .:..:.... :: • ·+·,'(/\,-_;',,:,. . ••• ·.i: •• · : ·: -~ .;'~: :\·· ~. • :•-: ... . •:· ! /· ·, '. ~ .• : .· . . [ },<~-~.~:_.:~ :· .~::· .~_:• · ;··.::?;.\ ..- ~:.-:··· :}·.··.\ :· -:.: ,•.·-:· · ''{ :·: ·- ·.. .. ... ..• > ~ t);J; :~•;/-;:~: :_; .\~:·· ..:__.. :>~~::.< :;;~..:.,· Secret l<JOFOFU'il The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Secret ~ec, et MOFORf~ The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974 Gregory W . Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach History Staff Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D .C. 1992 Sec,et ♦ Chapter 1 Searching for a System The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1 Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2 New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19 The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23 The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24 The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27 A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32 CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33 ♦ Chapter 2 Developing the U-2 The Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39 Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43 Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45 The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48 Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56 Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59 The CIA - Air Force Partnership .............................................................. 60 Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61 Delivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66 Initial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68 U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72 Sec, el NOFORN Hiring U-2 Pilots ........_................................................................................. 73 Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75 Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76 Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79 Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80 Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82 The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84 AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88 The U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89 ♦ Chapter 3 U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958 The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94 The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95 President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96 First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104 Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109 The End of the Bomber Gap................................. :................................ 111 Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112 Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122 Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128 The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133 Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135 The Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147 More Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149 Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152 British Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153 The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 ........................................... 157 ♦ Chapter 4 The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960 The U-2 and the "Missile-Gap" Debate................................................ 159 The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170 The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177 The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181 The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183 Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187 Geeret PJOFORN ..'t', Chapter 5 U-2 Operations After M ay 1960 U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca ................ ...................... ................... .. 197 U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. ..... ............ .............. ....... 197 Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ........................... ........ ....... .. 198 U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199 U-2s Over South America ............. ..................................................... 211 U-2 Operations in Asia ........ ........................... ......................................... 211 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ............... .... ..... 211 China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ................................ ..... ..... 215 U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216 U-2Cs for Detachment C....................... .................... ... ....................... 217 U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219 End of Detachment C Operations ...................................... ............... 219 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221 New Detachment on Taiwan ......... ......... ........................................... 222 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ............................ ....... 230 U-2s in India ................. ........................................................................ 231 Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237 Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 .............................. ......... 240 ~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~ =-=-=~ The End of U-2 Overflights o ain an China ............................. 242 Peripheral M issions by Detachment H ................... .......................... 244 Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246 Improvements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247 Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ... ... ............. 247 Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249 A New Version of the U-2 ...................................................... ........... 251 Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs............. ........ .......... 253 The Final Years of the U-2 ................. ................................................ .... 253 Support to Ot her Agencies .... .......... .................................................. 254 Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0) Chapter 6 The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .... ................ 260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270 Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274 The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277 See, et NOFOAN New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's Hig h Speed ............. 279 Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................ ....... .. ... .... 281 Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283 Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART.............................. ......... 283 Delivery of t he First OXCART ............................................ .................... 286 Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286 OXCART' s First Flights.............. ... .............................. .... ..... .......... .. ......... 288 Speed-Related Problems .... .. ........................................ ........... .... ............. 290 New Versions of the OXCART ............................ ............ ..... .................. 291 The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292 Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295 Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304 The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307 Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312 Summary of t he OXCART Program ...................................................... 313 ♦ Chapter 7 Conclusion U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315 Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319 U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. ....... 321 ♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325 ♦ Appendix B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327 ♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2 ........................... 335 ♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337 4 July 1954-1 May 1960 ♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .................... .......... 339 ♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347 ♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355 Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) NOCONTRACT (NC) PROPIN (PR) ORCON (OC) REL.. WN Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor/ consultants Caution-proprietary information involved Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator This information has been authorized for re­ lease to... WNINTEL-lntelligence sources and meth­ ods involved Classified by~~~~ Declassify: OADR Derived from multiple sources All material on this page is Unclassified. ieeret NOFGftN FOREWORD This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita­ tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program. which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi­ cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais­ sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study. The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program · managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover­ age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt­ ful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em­ ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance programs. Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in­ formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned -Sac,et See1et N0F0RN reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno­ logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national pol icy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today. Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of this volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript, Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demon­ strated her high talent as a copy editor, and[ [provided staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume. Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W. Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter­ viewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized. edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be­ come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦ J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff April 1992 Secret l\10FeAN PREFACE When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime. By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais­ sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non­ military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air Force provided vital support. The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad­ vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air­ craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71. Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in­ formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years See,et later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l (strategic reconnaissance) versions. The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B. Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac­ curate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air­ craft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been officially declassified and released. After the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac­ cess to classified documents by interviewing many former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by SeeFet Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures af­ fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects. In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro­ gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly impor­ tant for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen­ tation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews. Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received from many individuals who played important roles in the events they recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance of Agency records management officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance program is also greatly appreciated. To ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in over­ head reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to be described in very general terms. The omission of such information is not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency's recon­ naissance aircraft. ♦ Seeret NOFORN Chapter 1 1 Searching for a System THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob­ se_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi­ tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: '·'The nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next 1 war." By World War II, lenses, films , and cameras had undergone many improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster than the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be­ fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing afteiwarcl Peacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first in­ cluded only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental high­ ways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to using photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II, when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communi­ cation between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world. ' Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16. 6cc. ct P.OFORN Chapter 1 2 By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Sov iet military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activi­ ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities­ bomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weap­ ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was also largely an unknown factor. Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone-mo re secure, thereby greatly reduc­ ing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent secu­ rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents using covert means to communicate intell igence, travelers to and from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re­ port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth­ ods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other methods were available. Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance Although at the end of World War II the Un ited States had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence community established several programs to debrief German scientists who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but were now being allowed to leave.~ : A t the end of World War II. th<! Bri tish had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor. mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later ab­ sorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<! ­ gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the Returnee Exploitation Group ( REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[ ) he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff.. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S). I Sec, et NOF=ORI\J Chapter 1 3 Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in­ formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer. As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com­ pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights (called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet military response. 3 In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy'' to the Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en­ gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey also reported attacks on their planes. 4 ' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter­ view by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study are on file at the DCI History Staff. ' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987) that "the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949." In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer. George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S). -Seere:t Sec, et NOFORN Chapter 1 4 The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres­ sive in August I952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re­ connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become a very dangerous business. Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa­ tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan­ ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack. New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re­ connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais­ sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948, Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa­ bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu­ nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951. 5 ' Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington, DC. 19 August 1985 (S). SeoFat ~,etNOFOAN Chapter 1 5 In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet fighters . Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World. This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber­ the Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki­ lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which be­ gan flying in March 1950. 7 At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb­ er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that was stressed to less than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin­ ing fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi­ fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo­ graph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries. Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance • 13.716 meters. To avoid givi ng a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s. original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to the metric system. To convert feet to meters. multipl y by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85. ' Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West (Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I8. Richard S. Leghorn Secret i'JOF'OfUd Chapter 1 6 RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications. According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special- pur­ pose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais­ sance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance aircraft shou ld be capable of operating under wartime conditions. Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifica­ tions for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes, armor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights o f the Soviet Bloc. The final result of Leghorn's concept after its alteration by Pellegrini ·s staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude Seeret Sec,et NOFORN Chapter 1 7 was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~ In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol­ lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais­ sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance. Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup­ plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584 (Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to 90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn­ ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn, Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to 65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would not be activated. 9 The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un­ like Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im­ proved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad­ vocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars. ' Leghorn interview (S). ' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U). SeeFet iHret NOFORN Chapter 1 8 The Air Force Search for a Ni:tw Reconnaissance Aircraft With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growi ng, several Air Force agencies began to develop ain aircraft to conduct such mis­ sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft to give it long, high-l ift wings and tlhe American version of the new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year."' At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin­ ing ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with two German aeronautical experts--Woldemar Voigt and Richard Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine the high-altitude perfonnance of the latest turbo­ jet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti­ tudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was serving as assistan t chief of the New Developments Office of WADC's Bombardment Branch. By March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-alti­ tude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for "an aircraft weapon system having an operational radius of 1.500 nm [nautical miles) and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance missions during daylight, good visibility conditions." The require­ ment stated that such an aircraft must have an optimu m subsonic cruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the target. carry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment. 11 and have a crew of one. The Wright Air Development Command decided not to seek pro­ posals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a smaller company would give the new proj ect a higher priority and '" Phi lip G. Strong. Chic:f. Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. '" Recon­ naissance Capabilities." 21 August I 953. OSI records (S). " Jay Miller. uKkheed U-2. Aerograph 3 (Aus:tin. Texas: Acrofax. 1983). p. 10. Seeret Chapter 1 9 produce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con­ tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al­ titude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a singl.e-en­ gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial of 67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67 (later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and Martin's design was a big-wing version of the 8-57 called the Model 294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend­ ing designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more advanced concept from Bell was still being developed. 11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod•ify" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design. Lockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend and colleague from the Air Force's Office of Development Planning (more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit­ able for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance . Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian official in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that '' The request for proposal. known as ··Design Study Requirements. ldentiticatic1n No. 53WC-J6j07:· has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U·Z, pp. 10- 11. Secret ld0F8RN Chapter 1 10 Designs for the Air Force competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have co reach altitudes of between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and correctly forecast, "If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8. it should be capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960." Carter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which will have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before 1960 will. of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary procedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy." Some of the "nonstandard" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications. and the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed with a warning that time was of the essence: " In order that this spe­ cial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful l ife, it is obvious that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid­ ered normal. .. 1•1 Lockheed's senior officials approved Carter's proposal, and early in 1954 the corporation's best aircraft designer-Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the CL-282 but later to become famous under its Air Force designa1tor­ the U-2. Already one of the world's leading aeronautical engirneers, Kelly Johnson had many successful military and civi lian designs to his credit. including the P-38, P-80, F-I04. and Constellmtion. Johnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the fuselage of the F-I04 jet fighter but incorporating a high-aspect--ratio sailplane wing. To save weight and thereby increase the aircraft"s al­ titude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of " Milkr. U1''kheed U-2. p. 12. -See,oc / Chapter 1 11 gravity (g's) instead of the mi litary specification strengLh of 5.33 g's. For the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonaf­ terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the same engine he had chosen for the F- 104, which had been the basis 1 for the U-2 design). " Many of the CL-282's design features were adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detacihable. Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing- a common saillplane technique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other tea­ tures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot prnyload area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL--282's maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile range. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled gl I"der. .~• Early in March 1954, Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 de­ sign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and recommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to . sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a full description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s that included Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force. Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civi lian officials were very 16 much interested in his design but the generals were not. Kelly Johnson The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in early April by Eugene Kiefer. Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of " Lockheed Corporation. ··strategic Reconnai ssance and Intelligence ... Development Planning Note #I. 30 November 1953 (U). " Miller. locklctted U-2. p. 12. For more: J.:tails on Kdly Johnson's original pr,:,posal. see '"Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircrati Corporation. 5 March 1954'" in Helen H. Kkyla and Robert D. o ·Hem. Hiswrv of the Office of Special Activities. DS&T. Directorate of Science an<l Technology Hi~:torical Series OSA-1. 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). Th,: 16 volumes of this history contain 20 chaptr:rs . .:ach paginated separately. Future rd,:rcm;,;;s will be shorten,:d to OSA Hiswry. follow<:!d by the rekvant chapter and pag<:! numbers. •· Kelly Johnson Papers. ··Log for Project x:· April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation. Advanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California. Sec,et Sec,et NOFORN Chapter 1 12 The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth, and told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time." Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care­ fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at Wright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most powerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and Bell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re­ connaissance experts had gained their practical experience during " C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U). " Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12. See1et Sect et NOFORN Chapter 1 13 World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre­ ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de­ vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re­ cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already committed to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began seeking new sources of support for the aircraft. Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA Although the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin­ ued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott. Gardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because before coming to Washington he had headed the Hycon Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena, California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this '" Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California, 20 May 1985 (S). '" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 7 June 1954. iaaret Sec, et NOFOAN Chapter 1 14 design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant, Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary Talbott.~' According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri­ marily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intell igence. But General LeMay had already showni that he was not interested in an unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the A ir Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carryi ng bal­ loons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however. served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in­ formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!! Trevor Gardner Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve lopment Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft: Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re­ ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell. ... The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of 1,400 nautical miles. ... The CL-282 can be manufactured " Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach . tape recording. Wa.shington. DC. 23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd"y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2 Affuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79. " Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though he was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve. For S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the Norton interview (S). 6ee,ot Set1 el NOP'OAN Chapter 1 15 mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years. The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor­ mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. :; Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de­ sign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro­ cess of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs. During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hi red Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell . Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"' Philip Strong Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be­ fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud­ ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M IT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war, he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 unt il the end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953, when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United '·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl. '' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS Codeword). Gee,et Chapter 1 16 States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up­ rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: "I know I emerged from that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than 25 human means of intelligence collection. Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc­ cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad­ vise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the 0 Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.! Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al­ titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air Force finally turned down in October I 954.!' Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over­ flight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un­ dertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be­ come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement. " Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89. ,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence. from Chief. Support Staff, OSI. " Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job S0R-0 1424. bo" I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S). " Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. --overflight of Kapustin Yar.'' 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo" I (TS. down­ graded 10 S). Secret iac;ret l)IQFORL'I Chapter 1 17 Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli­ gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage, 1 which relied on agents rather than technology. s At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov­ ernment advisory boards. SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had played a major role in advising the government on technical matters during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific advisory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek scientific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-• The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be­ cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air " Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t (TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}. "' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<' USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC: USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U). DC/ Allen W. Dulles Secret ~OfiORN Chapter 1 18 defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head­ quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con­ sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group. The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P. Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M. Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation; Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col. Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer. 30 During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re­ connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess­ ful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible. This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted, nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using a large lens to photograph targets of interest. 31 After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem­ bers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of in­ telligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified "' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app. A (S. downgraded to C). '' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985 (U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington, DC, 24 April 1985 (S}. Sec1et Sec. et NOFOAN Chapter 1 19 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel­ ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo­ graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad­ vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda­ tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft: We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl­ edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten­ tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it with the maximum amount of information obtainable through aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of detection or interception. 1J Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon­ naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11 To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili­ tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap­ peared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto­ nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech­ nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). See,e'l Sec, et NOFOAN Chapter 1 20 scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And, at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen­ sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a menace to peace and world order. The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers.-'• Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel­ ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex­ perts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of 1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight­ ing the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1; " RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a Surprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California: the RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967). '' "AF Cites Red Bomber Progress," Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; "Is Russia Winning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, 'pp. 28-19; "Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'." Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; "Red Air Force: The World's Biggest." Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33. Sec,et Sec, et NOf'Oft~ Chapter 1 21 •.. g,., au£ • Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber (the Bison) .. ~: ... . :-.·~·~ .' . ~~~f':.:l-f.Je.) \': . The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the BEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and high-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study Group: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by Edward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and 31 Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). ' The chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a re­ search associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940, when he first advised the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then estab­ lished a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality "' Mc:moram.lum for Rolxrt Amory. Jr.. Dt::puty Direclor. lnlelligence from Edward L . Allen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operation:s Staff. OSI. "Meeling of lhe Intelligence Systems Panc:l of th.: Scientific Advisory Board. USAF:· 26 Augusl 1953. OSI (OSWR) records. job 80R-0l 424. bo:< I (S). Seeret Secret l\'JOFOAl\1 Chapter 1 22 lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research Laboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not end with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University, because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais­ sance. 17 The [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To provide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet Union, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog­ raphy taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the Urals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments and proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance, in­ cluding new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites. Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi­ ple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighter conversion"-for adapting a giant, I 0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re­ connaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-alti­ tude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by the summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnais­ sance aircraft. 3~ " Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of BGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force) formt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston University (Leghorn interview [SJ). " :\lemorandurn for Robert Amory. Jr.. Deputy Din.:ctor. lntc:lligence. from Edward L. Allen. Chief. Economic Research, ORR. and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. "Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientitic Advisory Boar<l. USAF,'' 26 August I 953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Cha<lwell. Assistant Director/Scientific lnrelligence. from Chief. Support Staff. OSI. .. Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific an<l Technical Collection Techniques... 13 May I955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records. job S0R-01424. bo:< I (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 !S) . ..Sasret See1 et NOFOftN Chapter 1 23 The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be­ yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political consequences. British Overflight of Kapustin Var The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air­ craft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in 195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls­ Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on 29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad­ vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli­ gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise. Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.") Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of 1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi­ cials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23 March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board at Langley AFB, Virginia. '" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21 October 1953," 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS, downgraded to S). ~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there is no evidence to support this assertion. GeeFot Sec, et NOFOAP~ Chapter 1 24 Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its members about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they were not cleared for this information . The panel did. however. discuss the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57." The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282 Allen F. Donovan The next Intell igence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25 May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem­ ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval­ uated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft Company. Even wichout Martin 's specifications or drawings, Donovan had been able to estimate what cou ld be done to the 8-57 by lengthening the wings and l ightening the fuselage. He had determined that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnais­ sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to military specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep­ tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need 10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.': Developme nt of such an aircraft was already under way. Donovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly­ ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9 southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers. When he was finally able to make this tri p in late summer, Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L. Eugene Root. an old Air Force acquai ntance who was n,ow a Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi­ tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life­ long sailplane enthusiast. Donovan im mediately recognized that the .,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S). Geeret Seeret NOFORN Chapter 1 25 CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain­ ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais­ sance of the Soviet Union successfully: 1 Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how­ ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24 September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did at­ tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com­ petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them. But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis­ tened intently. Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception. Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re­ quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli­ able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained, it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet, where it was sure to be shot down. The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet en­ gine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers esti­ mated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maxi­ mum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and " Donovan interview (S) Seeret Set1et NOl'ORN Chapter 1 26 wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man­ dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail­ plane wing. In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000 feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters..... Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the · A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back­ ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282 project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on high-level advisory committees. The Technological Capabilities Panel The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to " Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}. ~ et PdOfiOP\r\J Chapter 1 27 Gardner. the committee members decided to approach President Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili­ tary surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this problem.is T he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the most prominent members . MIT President James R. Killian. Jr. , to meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assess­ ment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April 1954, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the President endorsed the concept. On 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killian to re­ cruit and lead a panel of experts to study "' the country's technologi­ cal capabilities to meet some of its current problems." Killian quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office B_u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive. and i ntelligence capabilites. with an additional communications working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabi lities Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa­ rate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish­ ments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members began drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A James R. Killian, Jr. Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was ready. one of the three working groups took actions that would have a major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had " Beschloss. MC1ydav. pp. 73-7-': Technolog ii:al C:1pabi li1ies Pan.:I of 1he Science Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Auack. I-i February 1955. p. 185 (hereafter cited as TCP Report) CTS/ Rcs1ri<:1eJ Dat:1. <lowngrnJed to S) . .. Jamc:s R. Killian. Jr.. Spmnik. Scie111ists. and Eisettlww,:r: A Memoir of the r;;_~t Special Assiswnr to the Pre.~ide11t for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press . 1977), p. 68: Beschloss. ,W<1yJay. p. 7-i: TCP Reporr. pp. 185- 186 (S). Secret Secf@t NOl'OPU'-.t Chapter 1 28 Technological Capabilities Panel IThe President of the United States I Director, Office of Defense Mobilization Executive Staff Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee David Z. Beckler, ODM Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF Military Advisory _ _ Committee Lt. Gen. L. L Lemnitzer, USA RAdm. H. 0. Felt, USN a Brig. Gen. 8. K. Holloway, USAF a Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a Steering Committee Administrative Staff J. R. Killian, Jr., Director J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director L. A. OuBridge J. P. Baxter M. G. Holloway J. H. Doolittle L. J. Haworth E. H. Land R. C. Sprague, Consultant William Brazeal M. Comerford C. Klett L Wiesner E. Hockett D. _Le_wis K. Welchold • Constitute military consultant group. Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 M. G. Holloway, Dir. E. P. Aurand R. L. Belzer S. C. Hight R. Mettler E. H. Plesset W. Stratton J. West C. Zimmerman B. Horton L. J. Haworth, Dir. E. Barlow J